

APPENDIX 1

Are Americans Racist?

Racism isn't that big a deal anymore. No sensible person supports it. Nobody of importance preaches it. It's rapidly becoming an ugly memory.

—TONY SNOW

(soon to be press secretary to President George W. Bush), October 2002

I am constantly surprised by how much I hear racism talked about and how little I actually see it.

—DINESH D'SOUZA,

What's So Great About America?

AMERICANS BORN SINCE 1960 MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY COMPREHENDING that in the forty years prior to 1930, lynchings of Black Americans averaged between fifty and a hundred per year.¹ They may know that before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, many states had laws permitting or requiring segregation of Blacks from Whites in public places such as schools, buses, hotels, and restaurants. But that world may seem unimaginably remote. The quotes from Snow and D'Souza reflect dramatic changes that have occurred in the last fifty years, and with an African American president having been elected in the United States, their statements might seem to be appropriate final words on the subject of American racism.

But many scientists regard Snow's and D'Souza's statements as capturing only a surface appearance. This appendix looks at nearly a century of scientific studies of racial attitudes. That history will

provide a basis for understanding why many scientists now believe that, rather than disappearing, Americans' race prejudices have merely metamorphosed into harder-to-see forms. While milder in appearance than what came before, these evolved forms of prejudice may remain potent as sources of race discrimination.

WIDESPREAD OVERT RACISM BEFORE 1950

THE EARLIEST SCIENTIFIC STUDIES of discrimination in the United States documented prejudices against just about every ethnic and racial group in the country. Sociologist Emory Bogardus was the first to study prejudicial attitudes scientifically. In the early 1920s he asked Americans to say how close they were willing to be to members of forty "races"—almost all of which were groups that present-day Americans refer to as "nationalities" or "ethnicities" rather than as "races." The groups named in Figure 1—Greeks,

According to my first feeling reactions I would willingly admit members of each race (as a class, and not the best I have known, nor the worst members) to one or more of the classifications under which I have placed a cross (X).

	To close kinship by marriage	To my club as a personal chum	To my street as my neighbor	To employment in my occupation, in my country	To citizenship in my country	As visitor only to my country	Would exclude from my country
Mexicans	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Greeks	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Negroes	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Figure 1: Bogardus's measure of social distance for three groups

Mexicans, and Negroes—were just three of the forty groups that Bogardus asked about in the first study using his newly created Social Distance Scale. Considerably more than half of Bogardus's 1,725 respondents indicated that they did not welcome the prospect of even the most distant form of contact with Greeks, Mexicans, or Negroes. They preferred that members of those groups not even visit the United States.

A few years later, psychologist Louis L. Thurstone created a "nationality preferences" measure, which he tested on 239 White male undergraduate students at the University of Chicago. Figure 2 shows one version of the question that was put to Thurstone's subjects. However, instead of being asked to indicate preferences among just the four pairs of nationalities shown in Figure 2, Thurstone's subjects were asked to indicate this type of preference for all 210 possible pairs of the twenty-one nationalities that he studied. Using mathematical analysis of each subject's 210 judgments, Thurstone was able to measure attitudes toward each of the twenty-one groups.

This is an experimental study of attitudes toward races and nationalities. You are asked merely to underline the one nationality, or race, of each pair that you would rather associate with. For example, the first pair is:

Greek — Mexican

If, in general, you prefer to associate with Greeks rather than with Mexicans, underline Greek. If you prefer, in general, to associate with Mexicans, underline Mexican. If you find it difficult to decide for any pair, simply underline one of them anyway. If two nationalities are about equally well liked, they will have about the same number of underlinings in all of the papers. Be sure to underline one of each pair even if you have to make a sort of guess.

American — Hindu

Englishman — Swede

Negro — Turk

Figure 2: Four of the 210 judgments used in Thurstone's 1928 study of nationality preferences

Because twenty of the forty "races" that Bogardus studied were also among Thurstone's twenty-one "nationalities," it was straightforward to construct a picture (Figure 3) that shows how closely the two methods agreed in what they revealed about racial attitudes.




Figure 3. Comparison of Bogardus's and Thurstone's findings

In the upper right of Figure 3 is *American*. Most of Bogardus's respondents were ready to welcome Americans to "marry into my family," the closest relationship that he asked about. In close alignment with this finding, almost all of Thurstone's respondents judged that they preferred Americans over all of the other nineteen groups.

At the lower left of Figure 3 is *Turkish*. To get as low a score as

Turks received, most of Thurstone's student subjects must have said that they preferred every other group to Turks. Bogardus's subjects were similarly extreme—most of them wanted Turks to be excluded from the United States. For Thurstone's subjects, *Negro* received an even lower preference score than *Turkish*, while on Bogardus's measure there were four groups—Japanese, Chinese, Turkish, and Hindu—that were more readily nominated for exclusion from the United States than were Negroes. Perhaps this difference indicated only that Bogardus's subjects knew that "Negroes" were already well established in the United States, so keeping them out would require the extreme measure of deporting them rather than just denying them entry.

The degree to which Bogardus's and Thurstone's findings converged can be seen in the nearly straight line running from the points at lower left to those at upper right in Figure 3. The two researchers' different procedures can therefore be seen as having tapped essentially the same psychological phenomenon—a mental attribute that social psychologists of the 1930s were just beginning to refer to as "attitudes" toward the various groups—and the two researchers arrived at similar assessments of those attitudes.

One irrefutable conclusion to be drawn from this simple graph is that attitudes toward the less-liked groups were extreme in their negativity. For example, a majority of Bogardus's respondents did not welcome members of more than half of the twenty groups as either coworkers or as neighbors.

The negativity of pre-1950 Americans' race attitudes became even more apparent after 1929 when E. D. Hinckley introduced another measure, his Attitude Toward the Negro scale, which asked subjects to agree or disagree with thirty-two statements about African Americans. Six of those statements appear in Figure 4.

Consider Statement 1: "The educated Negro is less of a burden on the courts and is less likely to become a dependent or a defective than the educated White man." Most present-day Americans will consider the language of this statement objectionable enough that

it would be difficult for them to express either agreement or disagreement. Hinckley's subjects, however, had no reluctance about responding. Their frequent endorsement of Statement 1 was interpreted as a sign of a favorable attitude toward Black Americans.

Now consider statement 6: "The feeble-mindedness of the Negro limits him to a social level just a little above that of the higher animals." This statement (like quite a few others from Hinckley's study that are not shown here) may be so offensive to present-day Americans that their response to any survey that included it might be either to tear up the survey form or to request that the researcher who devised it be fired.

This is a study of attitudes toward the Negro. On the following page you will find sixteen statements expressing different attitudes towards the Negro.

Put a check mark () if you agree with the statement.

Put a cross () if you disagree with the statement.

If you cannot decide about a statement, you may mark it with a question mark.

This is not an examination. People differ in their opinions about what is right and what is wrong in this issue.

Please indicate your own attitude by a check mark when you agree and by a cross when you disagree.

1. The educated Negro is less of a burden on the courts and is less likely to become a dependent or a defective than the educated white man.

2. A wide-awake Negro is physically superior and in other respects equal to the white man.

3. The Negro is fully capable of social equality with the white man, but he should not be so recognized until he is better trained.

4. The rich spiritual life of the Negro compensates adequately for the defects in his nature.

5. After you have educated the Negro to the level of the white man there will still be an impassable gulf between them.

6. The feeble-mindedness of the Negro limits him to a social level just a little above that of the higher animals.

Figure 4: Six items from Hinckley's measure of Attitude Toward the Negro

The results of the Bogardus, Thurstone, and Hinckley studies made it clear that Americans of the first several decades of the twentieth century were very ready to openly express strong racial prejudice. Indeed, in the cultural climate of early twentieth-century America, it may have been as politically incorrect to express tolerance as it is to express intolerance in early twenty-first-century America.²

EVOLUTION OF RACIAL ATTITUDES, 1950–2000

AS THE SCIENCE of survey research developed in the second half of the twentieth century, researchers continued to refine the question-asking techniques of the preceding decades to document Americans' racial attitudes. They focused increasingly on Black-White relations, which became the most intensely studied form of prejudice—a status that it retains to the present day. To enable tracking of changes in racial and other attitudes over time, researchers administered surveys in which the same questions were repeated every few years. Q1 and Q2 below are examples of questions that were repeatedly used in surveys over four decades between 1960 and 2000. The changes in response over those decades tell a story similar to what many other studies in the late twentieth century showed.

Q1. Do you think White students and Black students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?

Q2. Do you think that White people have a right to keep Blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want, and Blacks should respect that right?

Figure 5 shows four decades of results for White Americans' answers to Q1 and Q2. In the early 1960s only about 60 percent of White Americans favored racially integrated schools. By 1995 that support had grown to nearly 100 percent—after which the question was removed from surveys because it was no longer informative. White Americans' endorsement of residential integration of




Figure 5: White Americans' increasing rejection of segregation (1963–1996)
Data source: Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo, L., and Krysan, M. (1997) *Racial attitudes in America*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Table 3.5A.

housing showed a similarly sharp rise over time, increasing from less than 40 percent in the early 1960s to more than 80 percent in the 1990s.

Q3 and Q4, just below, are two other questions that were regularly repeated in surveys of Americans' race attitudes. These questions asked about the appropriateness of government assistance to Black Americans.

Q3. Do you think that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks and other minority groups?

Q4. Do you think that Blacks have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards?

One might expect these two questions to provide evidence of the same increasingly favorable attitudes toward Black Americans that




Figure 6: White Americans' steady rejection of government help to minorities (1970–1996)
Data source: Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo, L., and Krysan, M. (1997) *Racial attitudes in America*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Tables 3.1A and 3.1B.

were revealed by the time trends for Q1 and Q2 in Figure 5. But, as Figure 6 shows, across three decades the time trends for Q3 and Q4 are flat. The top line shows gradually increasing opposition to government assistance to African Americans. The lower line shows that majority opposition to assistance to African Americans remained stable over the decades during which the question was asked.³

What does it mean that between 1960 and 2000 White Americans expressed consistent opposition to government assistance to minorities at the same time that they were expressing steadily increasing support for racial integration? Scientists have disagreed in interpreting these juxtaposed trends. One camp, guided mainly by the responses to questions such as Q1 and Q2, believes that Americans' racial biases have largely disappeared. The other camp, persuaded more by responses to questions such as Q3 and Q4, concludes that Americans' racial biases persist, but in altered form.

The disappearing-bias camp understands White Americans' sustained opposition to assistance for minorities as the expression not of racist attitudes but of a belief that Blacks need no assistance because America now offers equal opportunity for all. According to this position, which has been called the *principled conservative* view, the United States now provides a level playing field that affords equal privileges and opportunities to Black and White Americans. With this level playing field in place, there is no justification for government intervention to benefit those who are less well off.⁴

A majority of social scientists opposes the principled conservative view, holding that wide opposition to government assistance to minorities (as in responses to Q3 and Q4) should be understood as an expression of racial bias. They interpret the evidence of decreasing bias (responses to Q1 and Q2) by saying that racial bias in America still exists but has metamorphosed into a covert, less detectable form. This *covert bias* camp believes that many of the Americans who express egalitarian views in public continue to quietly harbor, in private, racial biases that remain potent sources of discrimination.

More than a decade into the twenty-first century, the debate between these two camps has persisted unresolved for about thirty years. A recent study that was designed to settle this long-standing disagreement asked 1,077 White Americans to respond to a survey including two questions about government assistance. Each survey respondent answered both questions. Half of them got this question first, which asked about assistance to women:

Some people say that because of past discrimination, women should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of women is wrong because it discriminates against men. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of women?

The other half of the respondents got the following question first. It was the same as the question above, with the exception of four

words ("women" changed three times to "Blacks"; "men" changed once to "Whites"):

Some people say that because of past discrimination, Blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of Blacks is wrong because it discriminates against Whites. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks?

The study's results showed that White respondents were less opposed to preferential hiring when it benefited women than when it benefited Blacks. From this finding the authors concluded in favor of the covert bias view: "The finding that people are more opposed to affirmative action programs for Blacks versus women is one of the most compelling indicators that race remains a factor driving opposition to affirmative action."

Although this interpretation has some justification, it is not the only possible interpretation. Many of the survey's respondents opposed government assistance for *both* women and Blacks, which appears consistent with the principled conservative position. Also, because the question about assistance to Blacks did not mention the gender of potential Black beneficiaries of hiring preference, the survey's respondents may have assumed that this question was asking mainly about Black men. If so, part of their opposition to preferential hiring could have been due to opposition to preferential hiring for men of *any* race.

The bottom line is that after considering the results of this interesting study, we have to conclude that both interpretations of survey respondents' unchanging answers (across three decades) to questions about government assistance to Blacks—the covert bias view and the principled conservative view—seem viable. And because these two interpretations do not actually contradict or exclude each other, it may be most reasonable to believe that each is partly correct. In other words, those who oppose government assistance plausibly include some who are racially biased, some who are principled conservatives, and some who are both.⁵

"UNOBTUSIVE" RESEARCH METHODS

BECAUSE OF the difficulties of drawing conclusions from studies based on question-asking methods, researchers in the 1970s began to develop alternative methods that had roots in two famous experiments from the 1930s.

In 1934, Richard LaPiere reported the results of an ingenious study for which his main piece of research equipment was an automobile. Between 1930 and 1932, accompanied by a Chinese couple, LaPiere toured the southwestern United States, where the trio stopped to request accommodations at 251 hotels, motels, campgrounds, and restaurants. They received the accommodations they sought in 250 of their 251 attempts, being denied only once.

Approximately six months after each visit, LaPiere sent a letter to proprietors of each of the 251 establishments, asking for a response to this question: "Will you accept members of the Chinese race as guests in your establishment?" Surprisingly, more than 90 percent of the answers he received stated that they would not. This was puzzling. Why were answers to the mailed inquiry so consistently negative, while face-to-face responses to the three travelers were so uniformly positive?

Any interpretation of LaPiere's study is complicated by a few details of his methods. For one, the person who answered each establishment's follow-up letter was not always the same person from whom the traveling trio had received accommodations. Even more important, LaPiere's Chinese traveling companions were young, polite, and middle-class, none of which was necessarily assumed by the person who answered the mailed inquiry. These complications notwithstanding, the unarguably important scientific takeaway from LaPiere's study was the value of using behavior observation in addition to using question-asking methods.

Mamie and Kenneth Clark, two African American psychologists who were interested in the way Black children internalized racism, reported a stunning series of experiments that came to be

known as the "doll studies." These started with work done by Mamie (Phipps) Clark while she was a graduate student at Howard University in the late 1930s. The Clarks' experiments showed that when young Black children ages three to seven were offered a choice between playing with a Black doll or a White doll, two-thirds of them chose the White doll. These studies later became famous to law scholars because of their role in the U.S. Supreme Court's 1954 decision in the *Brown v. Board of Education* case—the decision that declared racial segregation of public schools to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court drew on the Clarks' findings in concluding, in the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, that race segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority . . . that may affect the children's hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."⁶

What the studies by LaPiere and the Clarks had in common was that neither the proprietors visited by LaPiere's peripatetic trio nor the small children who made doll choices in the Clarks' studies had any awareness that their actions in offering accommodations or choosing among dolls were being recorded, let alone being used to infer racial attitudes. These were the first *unobtrusive-method* studies. But that name for the method did not appear until the late 1960s. And it was not until the 1970s that two forces prompted researchers studying discrimination to conclude that unobtrusive methods were attractive. One force was the expansion of scientific interest in prejudice, propelled by the tense and sometimes violently confrontational race relations of the 1960s. The other was a growing discovery of problems with question-asking methods. Social psychologists were becoming increasingly aware of the tendency of research subjects to fall prey to impression management—the desire to present themselves in ways that would be looked upon favorably by others (see Chapter 2).

The first researchers to develop new unobtrusive methods for studying racial bias in the 1970s wanted to see whether Whites would help Blacks with the same frequency with which they would help other Whites. Further, they wanted to observe this when re-

search participants had no inkling that anyone was observing whether or not they would help. Social psychologists Samuel Gaertner and Leonard Bickman invented a "wrong number" technique to see how a sampling of residents of Brooklyn, New York, would respond to calls from Blacks and Whites seeking help. The help seekers trained by Gaertner and Bickman called 1,109 Brooklyn residents, 569 White and 540 Black. (Because of the sharp racial segregation of Brooklyn's neighborhoods circa 1970, the researchers knew with near certainty whether each call would be received by a White or a Black resident. The callers themselves were also easily identified by race on the basis of racially characteristic speech accents.)

All calls began with the caller saying, "Hello . . . Ralph's Garage? This is George Williams. . . . Listen, I'm stuck out here on the parkway . . . and I'm wondering if you'd be able to come out here and take a look at my car." After being informed that he had not reached Ralph's Garage and after apologizing for his mistake, the caller (indicating some distress with his predicament) said that he had used his last coin in a pay phone, immediately following which he made the critical request: "Do you think you could do me the favor of calling the garage and letting them know where I am . . . ? I'll give you the number. . . . They know me over there."

The result: White call recipients discriminated by race—they were less likely to help Black callers (53 percent) than White callers (65 percent). For any single call recipient who did not help a Black caller, that nonhelping could have been race discrimination, but it could also have been caused by other factors—such as mishearing the phone number for Ralph's Garage, failing to make an accurate note of the number, or forgetting it. Problems caused by this necessary uncertainty were overcome by assigning all call recipients at random to receive the call from either a Black or White caller. This use of randomization is an essential ingredient of experimental methods, and it is what makes experimental findings convincing. It helped also that three later repetitions of Gaertner and Bickman's

experiment reproduced their findings, each confirming that the caller's race was critical. In each of these follow-ups, Black callers received significantly less help than White callers.

Another innovative study that used unobtrusive measures began with researchers preparing stamped, addressed, and (importantly) unsealed envelopes, each containing a completed application to graduate school. These envelopes were placed in airport telephone booths, where they would inevitably be discovered by travelers. Only data from White travelers were considered. When 604 of these White travelers found and (naturally) looked at the envelopes' contents, they could not avoid seeing a photograph that showed the applicant's White or Black face. A note in the envelope, which asked "Dad" to mail the envelope, made it appear that the applicant's father had lost the letter before mailing it. Again, race was critical in determining helping. The letter was more likely to be mailed when the applicant's photograph was White (45 percent) than when it was Black (37 percent). As an interesting additional finding, the researchers found that more attractive photos (of both races) led to more help.

Dozens of other experiments in the 1970s tested the amount of help that Black and White help seekers would receive from White potential helpers who did not know that they were being observed. The sought help consisted mostly of minor favors, such as picking up a box of dropped pencils, providing change for a quarter, or donating money to a Salvation Army stand attendant during the Christmas season. In a few experiments the help was more substantial, such as helping a Black or White person who had fallen in a subway car or who was standing alone on the roadside next to a disabled car.

When in 1980 social psychologists Faye Crosby, Stephanie Bromley, and Leonard Saxe reviewed a large collection of these unobtrusive-measure studies, they concluded that the findings of race discrimination in these studies disagreed with what was expected based on previous studies that had used question-asking

methods to assess race prejudice: "Discriminatory behavior is more prevalent in the . . . unobtrusive studies than we might expect on the basis of survey data." Crosby and her colleagues also found that race bias was more evident in "remote" interactions, when the help giver and recipient were not face-to-face. That conclusion very nicely made contact with LaPiere's observation forty years earlier that discrimination against travelers was expressed only in the remote situation of answering a letter that asked whether Chinese travelers would be welcomed.

The lost-letter and other unobtrusive-measure studies of the 1970s had the character of *Candid Camera*-type snapshots of behavior in natural settings, and they definitely strengthened scientific belief that racial bias remained a potent force, albeit in a covert form that appeared very different from the open racism expressed in the early twentieth century. After 1980, this type of research waned as researchers became increasingly reluctant to observe people who were unaware of being observed. Nevertheless, unobtrusive-measure studies still appear occasionally and they continue to reveal race discrimination in the form of reduced helping.⁷

ANSWERING THE QUESTION

THE QUESTION WE HAVE in mind is the one in the title of this appendix: *Are Americans racist?* The strongest case that America is no longer racist is made by results of surveys that use questions such as Q1 and Q2, shown in Figure 5. These questions and others that ask about attitudes toward segregation have shown changes spanning four decades, by the end of which Americans were expressing very little support for racial segregation. Another observation supporting the conclusion that American society is not presently racist is the extent to which egalitarian principles have been adopted in American laws and institutions. In addition to the existence of federal legislation outlawing all forms of racial discrimination in public life, it is now effectively a requirement for any

large organization—business, government agency, school, hospital, or charitable institution—to have a publicly stated policy that describes its efforts to be egalitarian both in the treatment of employees and in the provision of services to clients.

Egalitarian principles also now appear routinely in informal public discourse. The years since passage of America's major civil rights laws in the 1960s have seen the introduction of strong social pressures—often disparagingly labeled "political correctness"—that effectively prohibit spoken or written expressions of prejudices or stereotypes. The present-day power of political correctness is suggested by a recent list of famous people who made remarks that were taken to indicate their racial or ethnic bigotry, setting in motion barrages of negative publicity that no doubt were damaging in themselves but also often resulted in the people being fired from prominent positions: radio host Don Imus (April 2007), Nobel Prize-winning biologist James Watson (October 2007), actor Mel Gibson (July 2010), radio talk show host Laura Schlessinger ("Dr. Laura," August 2010), TV news anchor Rick Sanchez (October 2010), and radio news analyst Juan Williams (October 2010).

Two incidents deserve mention outside this list of prominent people embarrassed by racially or ethnically insensitive or inflammatory speech. After a November 2006 anti-Black tirade in response to audience hecklers during his nightclub comedy routine, Michael Richards (portrayer of Cosmo Kramer on the long-running television comedy series *Seinfeld*) used a television appearance several days later to make a very public and self-critical apology. In July 2010, a high official in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Shirley Sherrod, was fired for remarks that were almost immediately shown to have been misleadingly edited by political opponents to appear racist. A few days later, Sherrod received very public apologies from those who fired her. Although she was offered her job back, she did not return to it.

These unambiguous examples of America's rejection of racism notwithstanding, compelling bodies of research provide evidence

of remaining prejudice and discrimination (detailed further in Appendix 2). Even the 2008 election of Barack Obama, which many interpreted as proof that America had at last become “postracial,” contained its own clear indications that potent racial influences persist in American politics. If Obama had been obliged to rely only on the White American electorate, he would have lost in a landslide—exit polls revealed that Obama lost the White vote by 12 percent. That 12 percent deficit was noticeably larger than the 8 percent deficit in Obama’s White vote predicted by pre-election polls. The surprisingly large 4-percentage-point discrepancy between forecasts and the actual vote was itself an indication that racial factors were involved in the way people described their voting intentions to pollsters.⁸

Although racially discriminatory attitudes persist in American society, it is a mistake to characterize modern America as racist—at least not in the way that the label of “racism” has long been understood. Most Americans—a large majority—advocate racial equality. Although some Americans who oppose government assistance to African Americans and other minorities likely do so as an expression of either implicit or explicit racial bias, others base this policy stance on egalitarian principles, believing—in line with the two quotes that opened this appendix—that America has already achieved racial equality.

At the same time, it is all too clear that any portrait of America as a postracial society provides, at best, a poor likeness. The unobtrusive-measure studies clearly indicate otherwise, and many social scientists have interpreted White Americans’ opposition to assistance for minorities—as shown in Figure 6—as indicating the persistence of racial bias in a covert form that is quite different from the racism that was so openly professed in the early twentieth century.

We view America’s persisting racial bias as a strong undercurrent, composed of two types of hidden biases. What may be the lesser type consists of biases that are recognized and espoused by

their possessors but deliberately suppressed from public expression, plausibly in response to the pressures of political correctness and impression management. In our view, the stronger portion of the hidden undercurrent of biases consists of those that remain outwardly unexpressed for the simple reason that their possessors are unaware of possessing them. These are biases in the form of associative knowledge that can be measured by the IAT, as described in Chapter 3. Collectively, these two types of hidden bias plausibly contribute more to discrimination in America than does the overt prejudice of an ever-decreasing minority of Americans—a minority that remains content to openly express racial and ethnic dislikes.

APPENDIX 2

Race, Disadvantage, and Discrimination

THIS BOOK DEALS WITH MANY TARGETS OF BIAS, INCLUDING women, gays, religious and ethnic groups, the elderly, and the overweight. But we have given most attention to race discrimination—not only because of the societal importance of race discrimination in the United States but also because it has received more scientific research attention than any other form of bias. We continue that attention in this appendix, which focuses on two important questions for which much scientific knowledge has accumulated.

First, we ask what is known scientifically about the extent to which there exists, in the United States, the widely desired “level playing field” on which Black and White have equal footing. (Not to be coy about this, we conclude that the playing field is far from level.) Second, we ask a considerably more difficult and controversial question about what light scientific research has been able to shed on the causes of existing Black disadvantage. Our aim is to generate a list of conclusions that are widely regarded as being confidently established in scientific research.

A LIST OF CONCLUSIONS

AS A START, we constructed an initial list of ten conclusions about White-Black race relations that we thought might receive wide acceptance as scientifically established. Knowing, however, that our own acceptance of those conclusions might not be generally shared, we contacted about two dozen social scientist colleagues, whom we asked to tell us which of our ten conclusions they regarded as accepted and which they regarded as controversial.

The list that we ended up with retained only seven conclusions that were regarded as established by all or most of the colleagues we asked. The first of our final list of seven conclusions seems almost universally accepted. There is no scientific opposition.

CONCLUSION 1: BLACK DISADVANTAGE EXISTS

Relative to White Americans, Black Americans experience disadvantages—meaning inferior outcomes—on almost every economically significant dimension. This includes earnings, education, housing, employment, status in the criminal justice system, and health, all of which are detailed later in this appendix.

Conclusion 1 is deliberately silent on possible explanations for Black disadvantage. We have a path to travel before we can express any confidence in our knowledge of the causes of Black disadvantage.

Group-Responsible Theories of Black Disadvantage

Theories about the causes of Black disadvantage can be sorted into two categories. One set of theories credits Black Americans themselves with full responsibility for the disadvantages they experience. We call these the “group-responsible” theories. The other set is “others-responsible” theories, which place the entire responsibility elsewhere. The difference between these two types of theory is critical when one contemplates formulating policy for how American society can best deal with the existence of Black disadvantage.

Policies designed to deal with disadvantaged groups often reflect a “responsibility principle”—the idea that those responsible for creating a problem should be responsible for fixing it. This principle is set deeply into our psyches, having roots in earliest childhood. If young Suzie breaks her brother’s favorite toy, she knows that she is expected to apologize and, if possible, to undo or correct the damage—if not by fixing the toy, then perhaps by offering her crying brother a prized possession of her own. Although Mahzarin and Tony grew up in countries halfway around the globe from each other, like most children we were both brought up to understand that when we caused damage, even when we believed that we had not intended harm—as when Mahzarin urged her sister to do a headstand right after dinner—we had responsibility for the cleanup.

There are at least two kinds of group-responsible theories. The *biological* form of the theory assumes that race-associated genes endow Black Americans with strong predispositions toward violence and perhaps with weak dispositions toward productive work. The *cultural* form of group-responsible theory holds that it is Black American culture that draws Black Americans toward the pursuit of criminal careers and away from opportunities for self-improvement.¹

Some occurrences of Black disadvantage are not easily placed into either the group-responsible or the others-responsible camp. Imagine a hypothetical business—we’ll call it FairPlay Inc. Examination of FairPlay’s personnel records shows that, on average, its Black employees receive noticeably less pay than do its White employees. This is undeniably a disadvantage. Company records also show that, on hiring, FairPlay’s Black employees are typically assigned to lower-skilled jobs than their White counterparts. When questioned about the possibility that they are discriminating, FairPlay’s executives point out that their Black and White employees differ in educational qualifications. They assert confidently that all of FairPlay’s staff are being paid appropriately and placed appropriately in positions in consideration of both their qualifications and their contributions to products and services.

The FairPlay scenario is an interesting one. Although Black employees at FairPlay are undoubtedly at a disadvantage, if FairPlay's policies do not apply differently, in either statement or practice, to White and Black employees, FairPlay is *not* discriminating. Their managers are presumably not discriminating in hiring decisions, job assignments, performance evaluations, pay increases, or promotions. The higher average pay and position of FairPlay's White employees can be attributed entirely to the White employees having stronger educational credentials. If FairPlay were sued for discriminating against its employees, American courts likely would dismiss the suit as lacking in merit. The disadvantage at FairPlay would be attributed to societal factors operating outside the employment setting, for which FairPlay would not be held legally responsible.

Discrimination: Others-Responsible Theories of Black Disadvantage

There are several theories of discrimination that identify various "others" as culprits responsible for Black disadvantage. In the longest-established of these theories, Black disadvantage is the result of deliberate, overt race discrimination. A very different type of others-responsible theory credits discrimination to people who have no intention to discriminate and no awareness of doing so—their discriminatory actions can be explained as the operation of hidden bias. Institutional discrimination is a third type of others-responsible theory, crediting Black disadvantage to structural or regulatory characteristics of society's major institutions—government, schools, courts, hospitals, and corporations.

In America, institutional discrimination as a cause of Black disadvantage is undeniable historical fact. Documented forms of institutional discrimination include the now-defunct Jim Crow laws that, until the 1960s, segregated Blacks from Whites in schools, in restrooms, at drinking fountains, and on public transportation. America's civil rights laws of the 1960s mandated the end of blatant forms of institutional discrimination in the United States. But that does not mean that institutional discrimination ceased to exist—

only its most blatant forms are gone. As just one set of examples of what remains, in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. presidential elections, American news media provided many reports of discriminatory acts at polling places. For example, on Election Day precinct workers sometimes vigilantly applied voter qualification laws to Black voters while not giving equal scrutiny to the credentials of White voters. The selective enforcement of voting rights laws might be understood as an act of overt discrimination that is expressed through institutional structures and procedures.²

The Role of New Measures of Discrimination

Appendix 1 described the 1970s burst of unobtrusive-measure experiments that revealed race discrimination in the behavior of people who had been approached for help by either Blacks or Whites and who did not know that their helpfulness was being observed by researchers. The help seekers in those studies included stranded motorists trying to contact a service station, college students whose applications to graduate school had been left in a phone booth by their fathers, passersby requesting change for a quarter, Salvation Army volunteers seeking small cash donations, and experimenters who pretended to accidentally drop a box of pencils. Because those who were approached were assigned at random to either a Black help seeker or a White help seeker, it was implausible that any factor other than the race of the help seeker was responsible for what the studies revealed: Whites consistently gave less assistance to Blacks than to other Whites.

The disadvantages suffered by Black Americans in the many unobtrusive-measure experiments were modest—often no more than the withholding of relatively minor forms of help. At about the same time that those experiments were being done, other studies were beginning to use similar methods to discover the impact of race on outcomes with much greater economic impact. Housing discrimination was the first highly consequential area to receive this research scrutiny.

HOUSING

In the 1950s, informal versions of what later came to be called an *audit* method were deployed to examine possible discrimination against Black and Hispanic Americans in their search for housing. Although legislation had given all Americans the right to rent or purchase any homes they could afford, there were many anecdotal reports of Black and Hispanic home buyers or renters being discriminated against. They might be told that the apartment or house they were interested in had been rented or sold, even while a White investigator posing as a potential renter or buyer would learn on a follow-up visit that it was still available.

In the rigorous audit method that developed from those early efforts, researchers did not wait to learn that minority clients had been turned down by rental or real estate agents. Instead, pairs of White and minority testers, selected and trained to appear similar on all characteristics other than race or ethnicity, were dispatched separately to visit each renter or seller, to determine the availability of advertised housing. The order in which the two testers in each pair contacted each renter or seller was randomized so that White and minority testers were equally often the first of the pair to seek the advertised housing.³

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development conducted the first national audit study of housing discrimination in 1977. Another two national audits followed in 1989 and 2000. These three are the most important of what is now a large set of housing discrimination audits, almost all of which documented discrimination against Black and Hispanic renters and home buyers.

The same housing audit studies also documented that Black and Hispanic buyers were at a disadvantage in obtaining mortgage loans. Black and Hispanic home buyers might be denied a mortgage or be required to pay higher mortgage interest rates than Whites for otherwise similar loans. An added problem for minority buyers is that they might encounter greater difficulty purchasing

insurance for a home they wished to buy, effectively making it impossible for them to buy homes in White residential areas.

Difficulties encountered by Blacks and Hispanics in obtaining insurance or loans were sometimes the consequence of deliberate policies of banks and insurance companies to maintain racial homogeneity of neighborhoods—a now-illegal practice known as redlining. The 2000 national housing audit concluded, “Housing discrimination raises the costs [to minorities] of the search for housing, creates barriers to homeownership and housing choice, and contributes to the perpetuation of racial and ethnic segregation.”

Each of the three national housing audit studies was designed to produce a *net estimate* of discrimination, which is a comparison of the number of times the White tester was favored to the number of times that the minority tester in the pair was favored. A positive net estimate percentage indicates the favoring of White over minority testers. For the 1989 audit, the net estimates showed that White apartment seekers were favored 13 percent more often than Blacks, and White home buyers were favored 17 percent more often than Blacks. Both of these figures were lower in the 2000 audit—8 percent for both apartments and homes—but it is too soon to interpret the lower 2000 values confidently as evidence for a sustained trend of reduced housing discrimination.⁴

HIRING

There has not yet been a national employment audit, but there have been numerous regional audits that utilized rigorous methods. Hiring audits use matched pairs of White and minority job applicants, similar to the matched pairs used in housing audits. They also use net estimates of discrimination and have typically found discrimination against both Black and Hispanic job applicants. As in housing audits, the quality matching of the paired job seekers' prepared credentials ensures that they are equally qualified on objective criteria that can be gleaned from those creden-

tials, leaving race or ethnicity as the only plausible explanation for net discrimination. In summarizing the results of these employment audit studies, economist Marc Bendick found that they revealed average net estimates of 16 percent favoring White over Black job applicants and 14 percent favoring White over Hispanic applicants.

Two recent hiring audit experiments provided still more evidence for the role played by race in hiring decisions. One was by economists Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan. Responding to a large number of newspaper help-wanted advertisements in Boston and Chicago, the researchers submitted two separately mailed résumés that were equally strong on all relevant qualifications. The only thing that they systematically varied in the 2,435 pairs of mailed résumés was the first name of the job applicant. In each pair, one applicant had a name—such as Aisha, Ebony, Darnell, or Hakim—that suggested a Black American identity. The other had a name that seemed typically White American, such as Kristen, Meredith, Neil, or Todd. Bertrand and Mullainathan then just waited for the phone to ring. For the White-named applicants, the callback rate was 9.7 percent, compared to only 6.5 percent for Black-named applicants. The authors concluded, “A White applicant should expect on average one callback for every 10 ads she or he applies to; on the other hand, an African American applicant would need to apply to about 15 different ads to achieve the same result.”

Sociologist Devah Pager reported surprising findings from a hiring audit study she did in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Pager arranged for paired testers to apply in person for jobs that required no experience and only a high school education. After completing an application at the employment site, White applicants were more than twice as likely as matched Black applicants to be called back for an interview. The surprising finding was one that went beyond anything previously reported in audit studies: White applicants who described themselves as having a criminal record re-

ceived more callback invitations (17 percent) than did otherwise comparable Black applicants who did *not* have a criminal record (14 percent). The 17 percent callback rate for Whites with criminal records could also be compared with the much lower 5 percent callback rate for otherwise matched Black applicants with criminal records.⁵

HEALTH CARE

The Institute of Medicine (IOM), a branch of the United States National Academy of Sciences, was asked by Congress to examine the role of race and other demographic factors in American health care. Their 2002 report, titled *Unequal Treatment*, reviewed about six hundred studies in which medical diagnoses, treatments, and health outcomes were examined in relation to the age, sex, and race of patients. The IOM's conclusion: Black Americans and other minority groups suffered health care disparities that resulted in their receiving less effective medical care than did White Americans. These disparities occurred even when minority and White patients were matched on socioeconomic status and when they were known to have the same insurance coverage.

In the IOM study, health care disparities were found in treatments for heart disease, kidney disease, cancer, and HIV/AIDS. Members of minority groups received fewer routine screenings, less medication for pain, less surgery, less dialysis, and fewer organ transplants. Minorities also received less-preferred treatments. Diabetes provided a particularly disturbing example, given the disproportionately high rates of diabetes among minorities and the seriousness of diabetic complications. For example, minorities were more likely to suffer limb amputations that could have been avoided by earlier diagnosis of diabetes or by more vigilant preventive care.

Unequal Treatment's Finding 4-1 declared that implicit bias was a plausible cause, even if not a conclusively established one, of health care disparities:

*The committee finds strong but circumstantial evidence for the role of bias, stereotyping, prejudice, and clinical uncertainty from a range of sources, including studies of social cognition and "implicit" stereotyping, but urges more research to identify how and when these processes occur.*⁶

It is not easy to do the "studies of social cognition" that the IOM report urged. Medical institutions, like many other large organizations, are reluctant to expose themselves to investigations that might reveal bias. Nevertheless, some pioneering studies have used IAT measures of implicit bias in health care settings. Although there are still too few such studies to allow strong conclusions, the available findings have shown that IAT-measured race attitudes of physicians *do* predict the quality of the medical care they provide. Doctors who displayed stronger automatic White preference on the IAT made cardiac treatment decisions that favored White patients relative to Blacks. In two other studies, Black patients of physicians who had stronger White preference perceived their physicians as being less helpful.⁷

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

A 2006 study by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that 40 percent of the American prison population was Black. That 40 percent figure is hugely out of proportion to the percentage of Blacks in the U.S. population at the time—about 12 percent. Among prison inmates, the percentage of Black inmates incarcerated for violent crimes is higher than the corresponding percentage for White inmates (27 percent versus 22 percent), and there is a similar pattern for drug offenses (31 percent versus 19 percent). We cannot confidently say how much of the difference in imprisonment rates is due to different rates of crime commission by the races (a group-responsible explanation) or, alternatively, to race-discriminatory treatment by the criminal justice system (an others-responsible explanation). Nevertheless, some conclusions about

group-responsible versus others-responsible causes can be drawn from studies that have examined the role played by race in such police activities as stopping, searching, and arresting motorists.

A 2006 DOJ report summarized results of a survey of 76,910 drivers age sixteen or older. Those results included:

- About 9 percent of drivers age sixteen or older reported having been stopped by police. This percentage was approximately the same for White, Black, and Hispanic drivers.
- About half of the stops were for speeding. After being stopped for speeding, Black drivers (78 percent) and Hispanic drivers (85 percent) were noticeably more likely than White drivers (70 percent) to be ticketed.
- Among young male drivers who were stopped, Black drivers (22 percent) and Hispanic drivers (17 percent) were noticeably more likely than White drivers (8 percent) to be searched.

Although the frequencies of being stopped for speeding were found to be similar for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, what happened afterward was not, with Blacks and Hispanics more likely than Whites both to receive speeding tickets and to have their cars searched. Among male drivers under age twenty-four, fewer Black (58 percent) than Hispanic (81 percent) or White (also 81 percent) drivers regarded the reason for their stop as legitimate.

The DOJ report in which these statistics appeared was remarkably devoid of any conclusion about discrimination. In the only two paragraphs of the report in which the word *profiling* appeared, the report stated that there was no way to determine whether the higher rates of ticketing and searching Black and Hispanic drivers represented discriminatory bias.

However, in a 1994 study of the New Jersey State Police, psychologist John Lamberth was less reluctant to declare that traffic stop data revealed discrimination. Lamberth found that Black driv-

ers on the New Jersey Turnpike were much more likely than White drivers to be stopped and searched by the state police. In court testimony based on his study, Lamberth concluded that "the magnitude of the disparities lends overwhelming support to the assertion of discriminatory policy."

Our understanding of implicit bias leads us to favor a modified version of Lamberth's conclusion. Although it is plausible that some New Jersey State Police officers may have engaged in deliberate discrimination—perhaps because of either a personal policy of profiling or a profiling policy that was encouraged by their supervisors—it is also possible that the police were acting out of implicit bias. Without any conscious intent, the officers' hidden biases (implicit race attitudes or stereotypes) could have contributed to their stopping Black drivers more frequently than White drivers.⁸

MORE AUDITS

Americans buy many cars. The purchase price of a car is a significant expense for anyone but the very wealthy. It is an especially large expenditure for those with relatively low incomes who work at jobs that are unreachable by public transportation. To investigate possible discrimination in costs of automobiles, Yale economist and law professor Ian Ayres trained White and Black testers, some male and some female, to present themselves as equally qualified for an automobile purchase. Ayres's testers visited automobile showrooms in search of specific automobile models. Their finding: Prices quoted to Black testers were consistently several hundred dollars higher than those quoted to White testers for the same model.

Extending his interest to monetary transactions with much smaller dollar values, Ayres obtained the cooperation of New Haven, Connecticut, taxi drivers, whom he asked to keep records of their fares and tips. Ayres and his colleagues found that Black taxi drivers' tips averaged 33 percent lower than those received by White drivers.

A study of restaurant tipping by Cornell University psychologist Michael Lynn observed a similar race difference—Black waiters received tips 18 percent lower than those received by White waiters. Both Ayres's and Lynn's studies had an additional interesting twist. Both of them found that White customers were not the only ones to give smaller tips to Black cab drivers or waiters than to White ones. Black customers also did.⁹

CONCLUSION 2: THE DISADVANTAGE EXPERIENCED BY BLACK AMERICANS IS AT LEAST PARTLY DUE TO RACE DISCRIMINATION

The many experiments done with matched pairs of Black and White testers call for a conclusion that goes beyond our already stated first conclusion, that Black disadvantage exists. The further conclusion—one demanded by the great weight of evidence—is indisputable: Some portion of Black disadvantage is attributable to the way people respond to Blacks just because they are Black.

Given the variety and weight of supporting evidence, it may appear that we have been remarkably slow to reach this conclusion. However, we see this caution as an appropriate strategy, given our goal of limiting conclusions *only* to ones for which there is strong consensus among social scientists. The large volume of research, along with the consistency of the findings of that research, makes the conclusion inescapable not only to us but also to almost all those who are familiar with the evidence. These research studies have employed a variety of methods, especially including randomized experiments, which are the most powerful scientific techniques available to draw conclusions about causes and to rule out alternative explanations.

We have *not* concluded that Blacks and Whites are, in general, equally qualified for housing, jobs, or loans. Nor have we concluded that Blacks and Whites are equally law-abiding. (It is possible that Black Americans are more law-abiding than White Americans or vice versa.) We have also declined to draw any conclusions about whether Black and White taxi drivers or waiters provide the same

quality of service. Again, it is possible the two groups provide comparable service, but it is also possible that one or the other group provides superior service.

We are silent about these group-responsible explanations because the available research provides no decisive evidence. The research *has* provided decisive evidence on the outcomes to be expected when sound research methods rule out possible causes other than race, as has been done rigorously both in the audit studies and in the unobtrusive-measure experiments. Those studies have found that when random assignment and controls for causes other than race were in use, disadvantages to Blacks were consistently observed. The only plausible explanation for these repeatedly observed disadvantages is discrimination on the basis of race.¹⁰

But Is It Important?

All the findings of race discrimination described in this appendix merit serious consideration because they achieved the widely accepted standard of obtaining statistical significance. This standard, also known as the ".05 level," means that there is only a small probability (5 percent at most) of the finding having been obtained by chance if there really is no effect of race. But achieving the .05 level does not by itself mean that a finding is important.

To determine whether statistical significance translates to importance—meaning practical significance—one needs to know three things. First, does the finding involve an outcome that reasonable people would agree is consequential? Second, can it affect the same person repeatedly? Third, does it affect many people?

CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOMES

Sending an innocent person to prison or failing to provide treatment that would prevent an avoidable limb amputation are without doubt consequential outcomes. So yes, in some of the studies described above the outcomes are ones that are obviously consequential.

However, some of the forms of discrimination examined in the research involved more minor consequences. Nevertheless, more minor consequences can be important if they are repeatedly encountered or if they happen to many people.

REPEATED SMALL EFFECTS

Consider an athletic practice routine that improves the athlete's performance by 1/100 of 1 percent per day. That is so small an improvement that there would be no way to detect it statistically in any study that lasted only a few days or even a few weeks. In a ten-second run by a world-class 100-meter sprinter, that improvement is 1/1,000th of a second—a millisecond, the time it takes to run a centimeter! Nevertheless, if this practice method is repeated with that same small benefit for two hundred days, the athlete's performance will have improved by two hundred milliseconds, which is two-tenths of a second. That is enough to be the difference between holding a world record and being an unnoticed also-ran. In the men's 100-meter race, 0.2 second is how long it takes to run 2 meters and also encompasses the summed differences among the men's 100-meter race's last six world records, extending back to 2002.

Many minor acts of discrimination can produce effects that are likewise too small to be noticed when they occur but which, if repeated many times, can accumulate in much the same way—only with negative effects, exacting a serious toll on the targets of the discrimination.¹¹

Consider two groups of people, A and B, whom we follow through three years of professional education and three following years of employment. They all receive regular evaluations, such as by a supervisor who evaluates their work on a monthly basis. Assume also that each evaluation has a very high probability of success—99 percent—where success means continuing on their professional career path and failure means falling off that path. After six years of monthly evaluations, each with the same 99 per-

cent probability of success, the overall survival is just under 50 percent, which seems reasonable as a six-year survival figure for demanding professional work.

To reveal what a very small difference between the evaluations of Groups A and B would mean, let us assume that Group A's predicted success rate is just 1 percent higher than Group B's. That translates to a predicted success rate of 99.5 percent for Group A and 98.5 percent for Group B. After six years of monthly evaluations, that tiny monthly difference will become huge. Elementary algebra is all that is needed to establish that Group A will end up with twice as many survivors (70 percent) as Group B (34 percent).¹²

This example may give some insight into why the percentages of minorities (and women) often drop off sharply over the course of the years between taking entry-level jobs and moving into the higher positions that can be reached only after extended service in an organization. The greater attrition of women and minorities could be the consequence of very small levels of differential treatment that are encountered repeatedly.

Another example of the consequences of repeated small effects: We might not worry much if a person is denied \$10 because of discrimination. But if a person loses \$10 per week over a forty-year career, that adds up to \$70,000 (assuming 5 percent annual interest compounded monthly)—enough for a four-year college education at some public universities, a 20 percent down payment on a \$350,000 home, or several new automobiles.

IMPACTS ON MANY PEOPLE

If small effects are experienced by many people, they can add up to something societally significant. We might not be very troubled about a single person being denied the opportunity to vote on one occasion due to discrimination, but if discrimination keeps many people from voting in an election, it can affect the outcome—especially if the contestants are closely matched.

As an example involving a more substantial impact that may affect many people, consider the possibility that discrimination is a partial contributor to the 10 percent difference in recent high school graduation rates for Whites (91 percent) and Blacks (81 percent) in the United States. For purposes of illustration, let us assume that discrimination is the cause of only one-tenth of this 10 percent Black-White difference. In other words, discrimination contributes 1 percent to the 10 percent White-Black difference in high school graduation rates. We can figure out what that 1 percent means when applied to the total American population. (To be clear: Neither we nor anyone else has data to say whether this 1 percent hypothesis about an effect of discrimination on high school graduation rates is accurate, too large, or too small.)

The U.S. Census Bureau reports that as of July 2009, there were 39.6 million Black Americans, 71.5 percent of whom—28.3 million—were past high school age (18 or older). If the hypothetical figure of 1 percent is applied to these 28.3 million post-high-school-age Black Americans, that would mean that 283,000 of them would have been denied high school graduation because of discrimination. In other words, a relatively small effect of discrimination (10 percent of the difference in high school graduation rates) would have had very serious consequences for more than a quarter of a million Black Americans alive today.¹³

Expected Objections to Conclusion 2

Broad consensus among scientists on the nature of its supporting evidence notwithstanding, we expect Conclusion 2 to be controversial. Objections are likely to sound something like this: "If Person X doesn't want to hire a Black person (or rent to a Black person or give a Black person a mortgage loan), it has nothing to do with discriminating against someone who is Black. Rather, it has entirely to do with disqualifying characteristics that are more likely to be found in Black people than in White people." The objector may proceed to assert that, on average, Blacks have weaker job-relevant

aptitudes, are less reliable in making monthly payments for rent or loan interest, and are less respectful of property. A final step in the argument might be: "If I had the opportunity to evaluate two people, one Black and one White, who were equal in job aptitude or in monthly-payment conscientiousness or in their respect for property, I would have no reason to prefer the White to the Black for hiring, renting, or giving a loan."

Many people are likely to use such reasoning to conclude, "I am color-blind when it comes to these choices. I do not discriminate." We can believe that this self-description is very often true. Nevertheless, three decades of experimental studies have established beyond doubt that when Black and White job or housing applicants are equally qualified on all attributes from which one might infer their relevant abilities and personal qualities, the White applicant receives a favorable outcome about twice as often as the Black applicant.

Consider those who have been in the role of real estate agent or potential employer in an audit study, facing one of the Black, White, or Hispanic matched testers dispatched by researchers to seek an apartment, home, or job. Those real estate agents and employers may honestly declare egalitarian values and assert that they are certain that they will be equally likely to choose a Black, White, or Hispanic when all are equally qualified. How, then, are we to explain the repeated finding in housing and employment audit studies that Blacks and Hispanics succeed noticeably less often in obtaining desired housing or jobs than do equally qualified Whites? In the following section we try to work further toward answering this question.

SEVEN CONCLUSIONS

THE CHALLENGE WE SET for this appendix was to state conclusions about American race relations that are regarded as valid by most social scientists. Here is the list, starting with the two already

stated, and continuing with conclusions that have been developed previously in this book's chapters.

Conclusion 1: Black disadvantage exists. Compared to White Americans, Black Americans experience multiple consequential disadvantages—including, on average, less formal education, less satisfactory health care, less property ownership, less employment, less pay for the work they do, and higher rates of imprisonment.

Conclusion 2: The disadvantage experienced by Black Americans is at least partly due to race discrimination. The main business of this appendix has been to describe the broad range of evidence that establishes, beyond any doubt, that Black Americans experience race discrimination—disadvantage that is caused just by their being Black.

Conclusion 3: Social differentiation exists. Chapter 5 celebrated the mental virtuosity that allows humans to instantly sort people into highly distinctive categories—such as Black female Nigerian tap dancers or elderly White male Swedish furniture makers—and to immediately infer characteristics that they associate distinctly with these categories. Stereotyping is inseparable from this remarkably refined human ability to recognize and categorize human diversity.

Conclusion 4: Attitudes have both reflective and automatic forms. Attitudes are one's likes or dislikes for categories of people (lawyers, Muslims, Asians, babies, etc.). Chapter 4 described the sorting of attitudes into two types. Reflective or explicit attitudes are those that we are aware of having (for example, Mahzarin knows that she likes *Star Trek*, and Tony knows that he likes bebop), while automatic or implicit attitudes consist of associative knowledge for which we may lack awareness (for example, *old = bad*, shared by Tony, Mahzarin, and apparently 80 percent of everyone else). The two forms need not agree, which is a circumstance called dissociation. For example, explicit or reflective "I like elderly people" can exist in the same head with implicit *old = bad*.

Conclusion 5: People are often unaware of disagreement between

the reflective and automatic forms of their own attitudes and stereotypes. The regularly observed disagreement between a person's IAT (implicit) results and survey question (explicit) results that can be observed when race attitudes are being assessed could mean that people deliberately misrepresent their views about race on questionnaires. Although that must occasionally happen, we doubt it happens much. Rather, we assume that in answering survey researchers' questions, most people try to respond accurately and honestly. However, they may also be unaware of having automatic attitudes that differ from their reflective attitudes.

Conclusion 6: Explicit bias is infrequent; implicit bias is pervasive. Appendix 1 presented the evidence that early twenty-first-century Americans display low levels of explicit (overt) race prejudice in survey studies. This is a well-documented and striking reduction from the overt expressions of prejudice that were commonplace in studies done fifty to seventy-five years previously. Even though present-day questionnaire studies show that most Americans now express egalitarian racial attitudes, uses of the IAT have revealed that approximately 75 percent of Americans display implicit (automatic) preference for White relative to Black. It is important to understand that a race preference that is expressed only on the IAT is quite different from a personally endorsed racial attitude. Nevertheless, as we saw in Chapter 3, implicit racial attitudes do have practical consequences, and this leads us to Conclusion 7.

Conclusion 7: Implicit race attitudes (automatic race preferences) contribute to discrimination against Black Americans. Of our seven conclusions, this is the only one that was not on the initial list for which we sought consensus from our colleagues. It was not there for a simple reason: As recently as four years ago, when we first circulated our list, no one—including ourselves—was aware of how extensive an accumulation of evidence there had been for Conclusion 7. But, as we described in Chapter 3, a sizable collection of studies summarized in a 2009 journal publication made it

clear that there now exists a substantial body of evidence that automatic White preference—as measured by the Race IAT—predicts discriminatory behavior even among people who fervently espouse egalitarian views. This evidence is far too substantial to ignore, and indeed, it has continued to accumulate steadily since early 2007 (the closing date for identifying studies that could be included in the 2009 meta-analytic review article).

Recent survey studies show that only 10 to 15 percent of Americans openly express prejudice against Black Americans. Yet as we have detailed in this appendix and in several chapters of the book, there is well-documented evidence of widespread acts of discrimination against Black Americans that have put them at a disadvantage in just about every economically significant domain of life. Although such discrimination could conceivably be due entirely to actions by the small minority of Americans who are overtly prejudiced, the evidence for the role played by implicit bias is too compelling for us to conclude that Black disadvantage is caused exclusively by explicit, overt prejudice. And, given the relatively small proportion of people who are overtly prejudiced and how clearly it is established that automatic race preference predicts discrimination, it is reasonable to conclude not only that implicit bias is a cause of Black disadvantage but also that it plausibly plays a greater role than does explicit bias in explaining the discrimination that contributes to Black disadvantage. Implicit bias may operate outside of awareness, hidden from those who have it, but the discrimination that it produces can be clearly visible to researchers, and almost certainly also clearly visible to those who are disadvantaged by it.¹⁴